
CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

HISTORY

PART I 1941-1947

by

Joseph E. Roop
FBIS, 1942-1966

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April 1969

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Central Intelligence Agency
April 1969,
Released August 10, 2009

Available online ***here***

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To DXers of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS, then part of the CIA, was an opaque U.S.-government monitoring organization known principally through its periodic publication, *Broadcasting Stations of the World,* a multi-volume listing of the world's mediumwave and shortwave stations issued approximately annually from 1945 to 1974 (see p. 10 for a sample page).[1] Although FBIS was no stranger to newspaper publicity at the time of its establishment and during the war, the detailed story of its early organization had to await the release of this history.[2]

This book is not for those seeking information on FBIS technical capabilities, such as receivers, antennas, monitoring practices, etc. For that kind of information, see two excellent articles by Oliver Read: "Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," *Radio News,* January 1945, p. 25, and "Hams in the FBIS," *QST,* January 1945, p. 34. (The *Radio News* article is appended to this review. Read was Managing Editor of *Radio News*.) The Roop book focuses on administrative and organizational matters, and bureaucratic problems, at FBIS, not on band scanning (which FBIS called "cruising") or other aspects of monitoring per se, or even the analysis of monitored broadcasts. A more generalized history of FBIS is Stephen C. Mercado's online article, "FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945." But parts of Roop's history will resonate with those who have traveled for pleasure the same bands that FBIS monitors searched in the name of national defense. (An inquiry as to whether there is a "Part II" to this history has brought no response.)

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[1] FM and TV were sometimes included as well.

[2] https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/foreign-broadcast-information-service/

The author tracks FBIS from its roots in 1941. It was not the world's first government monitoring effort. The BBC Monitoring Service (BBCMS) had been formed in 1939, and other countries sometimes monitored foreign broadcasts even before that, as did various U.S. newspapers and broadcasting networks, and the Princeton Listening Center (PLC). The government was reluctant to leave this function in private hands, however, and sought action by the Defense Communications Board, which consisted of the navy, the departments of state, war, and treasury, and the FCC. It requested the President to transfer $300,000 in emergency funds to the FCC to set up a broadcast monitoring capability. The FCC's Radio Intelligence Division (RID) was already engaged in monitoring for illegal domestic radio operations, as well as monitoring foreign-language domestic radio programs, a function which FBIS carried on until mid-1943. (Some unhappy foreign-language program brokers were among those who contributed to the agency's run-ins with Congress.) The sum of $150,000 was transferred on February 26, 1941, and the Foreign Broadcast *Monitoring* Service, as it was then known, was born. Additional funding from RID and from Congress followed, giving FBMS an operating budget of $835,000 through June 1942.

Agency headquarters was set up in an old garage at 316 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C., and Harold D. Graves, Jr., Director of the PLC, became Senior Administrative Officer. Lloyd Free, editor of Public Opinion Quarterly, was soon appointed FBMS Director. Free also had experience at the PLC, as did several other early FBMS personnel. Qualifications for employment were very high, and staffing was made more challenging still by various civil service rules, by the prohibition–eventually relaxed somewhat–against hiring aliens (who often had the best foreign language skills), and by the policy of not paying extra for the nighttime work that was often required. Establishing the loyalty of FBMS employees was a matter taken very seriously, and there were some investigations of suspect personnel. Turnover was high. By mid-1941, FBMS had 220 employees, with "satisfactory" capabilities in approximately 20 languages, more limited capabilities in four more. The written output of FBMS was distributed to various government officials.



As translators, editors and analysts came on board they were put to work on broadcasts monitored at the RID facility in Laurel, Maryland. RID often performed the technical side of FBMS monitoring, especially in the beginning. Several times a day recordings were driven by station wagon to Washington for translation and analysis. As time went on, Washington, rather than the technicians in Laurel, began deciding what to monitor, and the whole process became more organized. Laurel was

replaced by a new facility in Silver Hill, Maryland, and soon the Washington translators were able to listen to broadcasts live via telephone lines.

True to his PLC roots, Graves was mainly interested in analyzing foreign propaganda broadcasts aimed at particular places, like the U.S. Free was more interested in the news as the stations reported it. Typed summaries of FBMS output was sent by wire to the State Department (the "A" wire) and the New York and Washington offices of the Coordinator of Information ("B" wire). A "C" wire, to the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, was added in 1942, and others followed. Various publications were issued, such as "German Broadcasts to North America," "spot bulletins" on various subjects, and several daily digests of broadcasts to different parts of the world. Just before Pearl Harbor a weekly survey was added, which became the meat and potatoes of FBMS. Soon it was being distributed to 87 different offices. Eventually it became unwieldy and was supplemented by a digested weekly review. Many universities and other non-governmental organizations sought access to this material, but for the most part such requests were denied and distribution was kept within the government.

Monitoring branched out from Silver Hill, and soon recording was being undertaken at RID facilities in Grand Island, Nebraska and Millis, Massachusetts (both were soon dropped), Portland, Oregon, Kingsville, Texas, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, with each station assigned to handle particular parts of the world. Silver Hill carried a heavy load, and Portland was especially important because it covered the Far East. By September 1941, Portland was recording Japanese broadcasts 24 hours a day, although there were deficiencies in Far Eastern reception in Portland, and delays in getting the material to Washington. In 1942, West Coast monitoring was supplemented by a San Francisco monitoring post inherited from CBS and the Office of War Information (OWI). Before long some translators and other non-technical staff were assigned to the various locations, decentralizing FBMS operations somewhat.

In November 1941 an FBMS office was set up in London, thus beginning decades of cooperation and information exchange between the BBC Monitoring Service and FBMS, an arrangement which, in its early days, generally favored the U.S., as BBCMS was monitoring a million words a day. In 1943 a "United Nations Monitoring Committee" was established to bring in monitors from other Allied nations, but cooperative monitoring remained mainly a British-American affair.

After Pearl Harbor the number of offices getting 24-hour service increased from one (the State Department) to six and kept growing, as did the number of offices demanding daily summaries and other services. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and OWI–the latter much involved in the transmission of shortwave broadcasts from the United States--relied greatly on FBMS information. The work of FBMS was highly regarded, and deemed indispensable by many. On December 9, 1941 FBMS registered its first scoop–Italy's declaration of war against the United States.

Speed, thoroughness and volume–providing more information faster–were the FBMS

watchwords. Roop discusses the various technological and administrative measures used to accomplish this–increased reliance on Western Union, Press Wireless, and 24-hour teletype lines to transmit information, revisions of work and reassignment of personnel at the various FBMS outposts, greater use of responses to specific requests of user agencies, etc. For the year 1942-1943 the FBMS budget was nearly $1.7 million.

In September 1941 a Program Information Unit was formed to keep track of station schedule changes. A regular publication covering this information, "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasters," was begun in March 1942 under the direction of well-known DXer and, at that time, full-time FBMS employee Roger C. Legge. Private monitors, including SWLs, sent their observations to Roger for inclusion in the publication.

In January 1942, FBMS moved its headquarters operation to four floors on K Street. Free resigned in April to go into the military. Replacing him was Dr. Robert D. Leigh, President of Bennington College, who, in July 1942, led the effort to rename the agency, which became the Foreign Broadcast *Intelligence* Service. By the end of the year the draft was taking a toll on the agency, whose personnel count was now 430.

Although FBIS was located within the FCC, the FCC made little direct use of FBIS output and thus did not seek to play a large role in its policies, although in many administrative areas, such as purchasing, living allowances and promotions, FBIS chafed under the same restrictive policies that were applied throughout all parts of the FCC. The FCC had little overseas presence, and FBIS personnel on foreign assignments in particular were faced with FCC administrative obstacles of one kind or another. There were also many problems of cooperation and divided loyalty between RID engineers and FBIS itself. This problem was not fully solved until the engineers were formally transferred to FBIS in July 1944.

FBIS and the FCC made no secret of the existence of FBIS, and described its work in press releases and other press contacts. In general, methods and operations were fair game, while the content of reports and the analysis of broadcasts were not, at least at the outset. On the other hand, FBIS made no secret of specific examples that illustrated the value of their intercepts, e.g. immediate translation of important speeches by Axis leaders, the gathering of hitherto unknown information from within the Axis, accurate predictions of enemy activities based on monitoring, etc.

Once the war was underway, there was much interest in FBIS output, particularly what the media viewed as "propaganda material," and much of this was released to news services, universities, the general public, etc. through an arrangement with the Foreign Service Division of OWI (which was often, incorrectly, credited as the originator of the material). Some press articles about FBIS were supportive of the agency's activities, some not. After the war, budgetary constraints were cited as the reason for once again limiting distribution of FBIS material to government officials.

A seldom-mentioned activity of FBIS was its support of Justice Department criminal cases against American subversives broadcasting from other countries, and sometimes from within the United States itself. FBIS transcripts of such broadcasts, supplied to the FBI and to other law enforcement agencies, were often important elements in such prosecutions. (In his *Radio News* article, Oliver Read gives an example.)

Many shortwave listeners (whom Roop refers to as "amateur radio fans") were interested in working for FBIS, and some did, including Roger Legge, who was a regular FBIS employee, and Charles A. Morrison, head of the International DXers Alliance, who, along with others, had a contract to supply FBIS with information. Roop, who discusses this aspect of FBIS operations at pp. 105-108, gives the listeners high marks. At pp. 108-115 he also describes the role of FBIS in the monitoring of POW messages, i.e. brief messages, either spoken by the POW or written down and read by an Axis announcer over various Axis stations. The government followed these closely, as did numerous SWLs, who, despite government discouragement, then notified the POW's family of the message (see "DX History/POW Monitoring" at ontheshortwaves.com). For the most part it was FBIS that did the actual monitoring of the messages, providing the text by wire to the Provost Marshal General, who had primary responsibility for notifying the families (save for the period November 1943-August 1944 when FBIS itself performed that function).

Roop goes into considerable detail on FBIS dealings with other governmental and non-governmental offices. The overall picture is one of an agency with many more client demands than it could ever satisfy within its limited budget.

Relationships with OWI were often rocky, particularly at the field level, where OWI demands for more information constantly exceeded FBIS capabilities, and in London, where OWI wished to deal directly with BBCMS rather than through FBIS. In the end a London OWI editorial staff wound up operating in parallel with FBIS, with both agencies sharing their London-produced output. (This arrangement ended in 1944.) That OWI was allowed to do its own monitoring from Istanbul, New Delhi, Australia and elsewhere–a decision supposedly based on FBIS budgetary limitations–added to the friction between the two agencies. Some FBIS personnel were assigned to OWI monitoring posts to ensure that FBIS received all the OWI output.

As to FBIS relationships with the military, things were mixed. FBIS received considerable military support for their monitoring operations set up in Hawaii and on Guam. On the other hand, FBIS budgetary constraints, as well as the inherent disadvantages of a small civilian agency functioning in a war theater–dictated that a North African monitoring effort headquartered in Algiers (which eventually grew to 250 persons) be placed under OWI rather than FBIS.

But FBIS's biggest problems were with Congress. Some FBIS employees were the targets of the House Un-American Activities Committee and its chairman, Martin Dies, who was not deterred by negative publicity about his charges. A subcommittee found two FBIS employees

guilty of "subversive activity" and unfit for government employment, and was successful in blocking the use of federal funds for their salaries. One was the head of the Analysis Section, another an editor. Other employees were charged with subversion by particular congressmen.

A huge problem was the investigation of the FCC by Georgia Congressman Eugene Cox, formerly a supporter of the agency but, in 1943, a foe as a result of the FCC chairman's referral to the Justice Department of a matter involving Cox, namely his acceptance of money from an Atlanta radio station for legal work; his use of the funds to purchase stock in the station; and his promotion of the station's interests before the FCC, all in violation of a federal statute. The Cox inquiry was aggressive and very disruptive of FBIS operations. Cox accused FBIS

> of "masquerading" as a war agency; of using "intelligence" in its name to misrepresent its operations; of being no more than "a glorified news gathering agency" serving the press and radio; of being of no value to war activities; of being illegally established; of duplicating the work of OWI; of operating overseas illegally; of spending money for unauthorized purposes; of operating illegally at a deficit; of fraudulently obtaining supplemental appropriations; of monopolizing scarce manpower for useless operations and obtaining unwarranted deferments; of employing 15 to 20 subversive and dangerous persons; of illegally charging other government agencies for its services; of hiring inexperienced and poorly informed analysts; and of forcing its "useless and unwanted" publications on other offices.[3]

But FBIS went into high gear to defend itself publicly, and so great was the reaction of the press and public to the Cox charges that Cox wound up resigning.[4] His successor was more even handed, but testimony was not given until mid-1944, and the preparation needed in the intervening period devoured a great deal of FBIS time. In early January 1945, FBIS was cleared of all charges of wrongdoing, but it had gotten a lesson in the importance of good congressional relations, one that was underscored when its budget ran into difficulties.

FBIS always seemed to be cutting back in the face of inadequate budgets and increased demands for its services. One result was that the Kingsville and San Juan monitoring posts were closed. As the war continued, qualified personnel were also in short supply. Finding able and willing Japanese speakers and obtaining permission to assign them to the West Coast was particularly difficult.

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[3]Pp. 198-199.

[4]Director Leigh's side of the story is told in Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats," *Harper's Magazine,* January 1945, p. 97

From the standpoint of an SWL, one of the most interesting parts of Roop's book is his considerable discussion[5] of what appeared to be a very muddled understanding of the reception conditions that could have been expected at several FBIS posts, namely San Juan, Kingsville and Hawaii. FBIS was surprised to find that most African and European stations, two of the intended targets of the San Juan monitoring facility, could be heard satisfactorily in Washington, D.C.; and that most of Latin America–another San Juan target–could be heard as well in Kingsville. The result was that staff in San Juan was much reduced, and the facility was closed altogether in February 1944.

FBIS was similarly surprised that Kingsville reception from Latin America was subject to static for six months of the year. (In 1943 Florida had been considered as an alternative site for Latin American reception, but this never came to fruition.) Moreover, it was in March 1944 that an FBIS official classified Latin American broadcasts as "about the worst drivel imaginable" (save for "occasional short spurts").[6] Kingsville closed in April 1944. A few months earlier it had been found that much of the Latin American coverage by Kingsville could be had from San Francisco and Silver Hill.

Reception from Japan was the province of the Portland and San Francisco installations, with Portland doing the bulk of the work because of the difficulties in obtaining authorization for Japanese Americans to work in San Francisco. But coverage of Japan from Portland was never very good. It was suggested that Japanese and Philippine mediumwave stations could be heard from Hawaii during the winter and fall. FBIS officialdom was uncertain that Hawaii could produce better monitoring than Portland, even after listening to recordings made in Hawaii. Moreover, some FBIS personnel believed that the Japanese programs on mediumwave and shortwave were the same. The decision was made to set up a Hawaiian monitoring post, which came online late in 1944. Soon thereafter the San Francisco monitoring site was closed.

A projected Oahu site for monitoring gave way to one on Kauai, in part because on Oahu "[a]t times reception was astonishingly good. At other times interference, static, and fade-outs made it impossible to get complete texts."[7] Eventually it was found that "Kauai received clearly many programs that could not be heard at all on the West Coast, and no Far East broadcast was received better on the Coast than on Kauai."[8]

While individual monitoring locations would no doubt vary from one another in terms of various specific local factors, that an agency with long distance radio reception at the heart of its

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[5]Pp. 227-251.

[6]P. 230.

[7]P. 240.

[8]P. 247.

mission could fail to understand some of the basics of "DX" comes as a bit of a shock. That African and European reception could be had about as well in Washington, D.C. as in Puerto Rico, that the latter location would have no particular monopoly on Latin American reception, or that Latin America programming was very different from that of Europe would come as no surprise to anyone with on-the-ground familiarity with shortwave broadcasting. That reception degrades in the summer, that noise, fading and static are a standard part of long distance reception (especially on mediumwave), or that Far Eastern reception is going to be better in Hawaii than in Portland, Oregon, are all "DXing 101." Shortwave was 20 years old by the time of World War II, and the fine points of reception were well understood by experienced SWLs, who could have put these issues to rest easily. That they befuddled FBIS is quite a surprise.

Charles A. Hyneman took over as FBIS director in July 1944. Before long, as military victory in Europe came into sharper view, and even as demands for services stayed constant, he realized that the focus on Asia would intensify and that post war cutbacks were in the offing. During 1944-45, FBIS was already operating with a budget reduced 22% below 1943-1944, and a personnel complement that had dropped by 25%. Various services were cut back, including Latin American monitoring, which ended in August 1945. Hyneman left his post early the same month and was succeeded by Russell Shepherd, who had been head of Pacific operations.

Japan's surrender in August presented immediate questions as to FBIS's future, for the agency's appropriation provided for termination of FBIS 60 days after an armistice. Hyneman set up a committee, which, not unexpectedly, outlined the many benefits of continued monitoring during peacetime. But the matter prompted little immediate interest by regular users of FBIS information–many of whom were contending with peacetime issues of their own–except for one area: there was interest in continued intelligence on Russian postwar aims.

FBIS sought to muster support in the budgetary process, and received a good deal of it, including from the State Department. In the end, while FBIS appropriations were depleted, the War Department agreed to assume responsibility for the agency on a temporary basis, and it was so transferred as of January 2, 1946. The process was messy in some respects, but the agency retained much of its shape and function. And its output was now made available to the public and the press as a matter of course. The military asked the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), successor to OSS and predecessor to the CIA, to decide the agency's permanent status. The recommendation, with which the State Department concurred, was that it stay in the War Department. The War Department had other ideas, however, and in the end, effective July 31, 1946, the agency was placed in the Office of Operations of CIG, where it was renamed the Foreign Broadcast *Information* Service, and then renamed again the Foreign Broadcast Information *Branch* (it had almost been renamed the Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service in April 1945). With the formation of the CIA in 1947 it again became the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

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Many copies of *Broadcasting Stations of the World* are archived on line at this University of Illinois website http://libsysdigi.library.illinois.edu/oca/Books2007-07/broadcastingstat/. What may be the first copy of the publication can be found under "Lists, Logs, Guides & Columns" at http://www.ontheshortwaves.com/history.html, together with a Microsoft Access database file of its contents. One of the problems that DXers found in using *Broadcasting Stations of the World* was that old entries were not always deleted, and thus the volumes, while of historical value, were not considered as up to date as the *World Radio TV Handbook.*

The records of FBIS are stored at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and would undoubtedly make for interesting research by some enterprising SWL (and perhaps some interesting listening as well, since the records include recordings).

FREQ. (in kcs.)	COUNTRY / STATION NAME / OWNERSHIP	CITY	SYMBOL	CALL	W/L	POWER
6080	JAPAN RADIO JAPAN/NIPPON HOSO KYOKAI BROADCASTING CORPORATION OF JAPAN	TOKYO (NAZAKI/YAMATA)			49.34	50000
6080	MALAYSIA BBC FAR EASTERN STATION BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION	TEBRAU			49.34	7500 75000
6080	NEW ZEALAND RADIO NEW ZEALAND NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING CORPORATION	WELLINGTON (TITAHI BAY)		ZL7	49.34	7500
6080	PHILIPPINES VOICE OF MANILA METROPOLITAN BROADCASTING CO.	MANILA (NAVOTAS, RIZAL)		DZI7	49.34	250
6080	UNITED KINGDOM BBC BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION	LONDON			49.34	15000 250000
6080	UNITED KINGDOM RELAYS VOICE OF AMERICA BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION	WOOFFERTON			49.34	250000
6080	USSR GOVT	KHABAROVSK			49.34	
6082	PERU RADIO NACIONAL DEL PERU RADIO NACIONAL DEL PERU (GOVT)	LIMA (SAN MIGUEL)		OAX4Z	49.33	10000
6085	BRAZIL RADIO JORNAL DO COMMERCIO EMPRESA JORNAL DO COMMERCIO S.A.	RECIFE P E		ZYK2	49.30	10000
6085	COLOMBIA ECOS DE PASTO ANTONIO J. MENESES	PASTO		HJDX	49.30	1000
6085	CONGO (D.R.) RADIODIFN. DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO GOVT	KISANGANI	V		49.30	10000
6085	GERMANY WEST BAYERISCHER RUNDFUNK BAYERISCHER RUNDFUNK	MUNICH (ISMANING)			49.30	10000
6085	HONDURAS RADIO MORAZAN FRANCISCO PON AGUILAR	TEGUCIGALPA	V	HRNQ	49.30	1500
6085	INDIA ALL INDIA RADIO ALL INDIA RADIO (GOVT)	MADRAS			49.30	100000
6085	NETHERLANDS RADIO NEDERLAND STICHTING RADIO NEDERLAND WERELDOMROEP	HILVERSUM (IJSSELSTEIN)			49.30	50000 100000
6085	NICARAGUA RADIO PHILLIPS, ONDAS POPULARES MIGUEL ANGEL SOLIS G.	LEON	I	YNMS	49.30	500
6085	USSR GOVT	TALLINN			49.30	50000
6090	ALBANIA RADIO TIRANA RADIODIFFUSION ET TELEVISION ALBANAISE (GOVT)	TIRANA			49.26	
6090	ARGENTINA RADIO BELGRANO	BUENOS AIRES (HURLINGHAM)		LRY1	49.26	35000
6090	AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION	SYDNEY		VLI6	49.26	2000
6090	CAMBODIA RADIODIFFUSION NATIONALE KHMERE GOVT	PHNOM PENH (STUNG MEAN CHEY)			49.26	50000
6090	CANADA RADIO CANADA CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION	MONTREAL (SACKVILLE, N.B.)			49.26	50000
6090	CHINA TAIWAN CHIAOYU CHIH SHENG CHIAOYU KWANG PO TIEN TAI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (GOVT)	TAIPEI			49.26	3000
6090	CHINA TAIWAN TAOYUAN CHUN CHUNG CHIH SHENG KWANG PO TIEN TAI MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (ARMED FORCES)	TAOYUAN		BEC26	49.26	3000
6090	DOMINICAN REP. RADIO QUISQUEYA INTERNACIONAL RADIO TELEVISION DOMINICANA (GOVT)	SANTO DOMINGO		HISD	49.26	7500
6090	LIBERIA LIBERIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION LIBERIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION	MONROVIA (PAYNESVILLE)		ELBC	49.26	10000
6090	LUXEMBOURG RADIO LUXEMBOURG CIE. LUXEMBOURGEOISE DE TELEDIFFUSION	JUNGLINSTER			49.26	50000
6090	MEXICO RELAYS XECM RICARDO LOPEZ MENDEZ RELAYS XECM	CIUDAD MANTE, TAMS.		XECMT	49.26	1000
6090	NIGERIA RADIOTELEVISION KADUNA BROADCASTING CO. OF NORTHERN NIGERIA	KADUNA (JAJI)			49.26	10000
6090	UNITED KINGDOM BBC BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION	LONDON			49.26	15000 250000
6090	USSR RADIO MOSCOW GOVT	EUROPEAN USSR			49.26	15000 120000
6090	USSR GOVT	IRKUTSK			49.26	50000
6095	BRAZIL RADIO TUPI/RADIO DIFUSORA SAO PAULO RADIO DIFUSORA SAO PAULO S A	SAO PAULO S P		ZYB7	49.22	25000
6095	CHINA TAIWAN CHUNGYANG K.T. TSUYU CHUNG KUO CHIH SHENG BROADCASTING CORPORATION OF CHINA (GOVT)	TAIPEI			49.22	3000
6095	COLOMBIA LA VOZ DEL CENTRO D. DE PAVA	EL ESPINAL		HJIW	49.22	1000
6095	FREEDOM RADIOSTANSIYA SVOBODA/RADIO LIBERTY RADIO LIBERTY COMMITTEE INC.	MUNICH (LAMPTHM./PL. DE PALS)			49.22	20000 500000
6095	FREEDOM RADIO FREE EUROPE FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE INC.	MUNICH (BIBLIS/HOLZ./GLORIA)			49.22	10000 250000
6095	IRAQ IDHAAT AL-JUMHURIYAH AL-IRAQIYAH FI BAGHDAD GOVT	BAGHDAD (SALMON PAK)			49.22	100000
6095	ITALY RADIO TELEVISIONE ITALIANA RADIO TELEVISIONE ITALIANA (GOVT)	ROME (PRATO SMERALDO)			49.22	50000 100000
6095	PERU RADIO MUNDIAL RADIO OFICIAL DEL CONGRESO DEL PERU (GOVT)	LIMA	V	OAX4H	49.22	250
6095	SOMALI REPUBLIC RADIO MOGADISCIO, THE VOICE OF SOMALI GOVT	MOGADISCIO	V		49.22	50000
6095	SOUTH AFRICA RADIO SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICAN BDCSTG. CORPORATION (GOVT)	JOHANNESBURG (PARADYS)			49.22	20000
6095	SWEDEN RADIO SWEDEN/SVERIGES RADIO SVERIGES RADIO (GOVT)	STOCKHOLM (HOERBY)			49.22	100000
6095	THAILAND PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT (GOVT)	BANGKOK			49.22	1000
6100	CHILE RADIO CALAMA PEDRO VERGARA KELLER	CALAMA		CE610	49.18	250
6100	CUBA RADIO HAVANA CUBA INSTITUTO CUBANO DE RADIODIFUSION (GOVT)	HAVANA	A		49.18	10000 100000
6100	ECUADOR LA VOZ DEL VOLANTE SDCTO. PROVINCIAL DEL CHOFERES DE MANIBITA	PORTOVIEJO		HCSP4	49.18	1000
6100	GERMANY WEST DEUTSCHE WELLE/THE VOICE OF GERMANY DEUTSCHE WELLE	COLOGNE (JUELICH)			49.18	100000
6100	HAITI RADIO LUMIERE WEST INDIES BIBLE MISSION	AUX CAYES	V	4VO	49.18	250
6100	HAITI LA VOIX DE L AVE MARIE CATHOLIC CHURCH	CAP HAITIEN	I		49.18	540
6100	INDIA ALL INDIA RADIO ALL INDIA RADIO (GOVT)	KURSEONG			49.18	20000
6100	MALAYSIA VOICE OF MALAYSIA GOVT	KUALA LUMPUR (KAJANG)			49.18	100000

FOREIGN BROADCAST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

By OLIVER READ, W9ETI
Managing Editor, RADIO NEWS

Radio, as an instrument of propaganda, has proved its importance beyond any doubt. It reveals many psychological slips.

A LITTLE-KNOWN governmental agency, but one of extreme importance in wartime, is the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the Federal Communications Commission.

The FBIS came into being nine months before Pearl Harbor when this official monitoring service was set up to keep our Government informed of what the enemy radio was saying to its own people, to neutrals, and to its enemies. Due to lack of normal peacetime sources of information, a continuous round-the-clock monitoring of the short waves provided intelligence agencies of this and other friendly governments with valuable clués as to enemy strategy and how best it might be combated on military, economic, and propaganda fronts. Four listening posts manned by skilled engineers, linguists, students of public affairs, and editors sift through 2,500,000 words a day of foreign broadcast material and send it minute-by-minute over teletypes to nineteen government war agencies. It is interesting to go back and review the normal chain of events that led to the development of the FBIS.

Radio broadcasting developed originally in the "medium-wave" part of the radio spectrum—the part where most ordinary domestic broadcasting is now carried on. Dr. Frank Conrad of Westinghouse and Signor Marconi in Italy were experimenting with broadcasting on much shorter wavelengths early in 1923, using radio waves of 100 meters or less instead of the 360-meter waves used by standard broadcasting at that time. It was noted that for long-distance broadcasting these shorter waves possessed many

FBIS receiving station at Silver Hill, Md. Highly directional antennas connect at this building to one of the most elaborate receiving installations in the world.



Audio level and output control panel, used at the FBIS receiving station at Silver Hill, Md. (P) Push buttons to check audio level. (C) Selective switch for phone output. (M) Voltmeter (0-150) with 2250 ohms substituted for multiplier. (S) Selective switch for Memovox recorders. (J) Phone jack. (T) Terminal for rack of four receivers.

advantages. Soon experimental short-wave broadcasting stations in the U. S. and in England were exchanging programs. Thus, international broadcasting was inaugurated about 1923.

These original international broadcasts were *relayed*. There existed in each country but a handful of radio receivers capable of tuning in short-wave programs. The only way to build up audiences for these broadcasts was to pick them up and then rebroadcast them in the standard radio band used by ordinary listeners. The cooperation of radio stations in both countries was required for successful international broadcasting.

No one doubted in the early twenties that this international broadcasting would be a prime force of international peace and good will among nations. They anticipated no friction. Shortly thereafter, however, radio amateurs and others began constructing radio receivers which were able to pick up foreign broadcasts directly by short-wave instead of being limited to the standard band rebroadcasts of these international programs. Soon, enterprising manufacturers were marketing radio receivers that included short-wave bands and anyone could listen to foreign broadcasts on short-wave.

The result was that the international broadcast stations could build up listening audiences from other countries even for those programs which the other countries chose not to rebroadcast. About this time medium-wave broadcasts were being used across national borders for political propaganda. The Russians took the lead in this field. Adolph Hitler in 1933 rose to power with his doctrine that "words are deeds" and quickly perceived the disrupted possibility of sowing seeds of distrust and dissension by international radio. Short-wave transmitters became a new kind of Nazi weapon.

Transmitters were pouring forth words in scores of languages by 1938. Great Britain used the short waves extensively as a means of welding the far flung dominions to the Mother country. The League of Nations broadcast news of its activities through a powerful Swiss station. The Nazis were stirring up conflict within neighboring countries.

The Germans developed special directional antenna systems for their transmitters and beamed their propaganda to every corner of the world. The British, for example, would be told that the United States would soon dominate the world, while the Americans were simultaneously being warned through another transmitter that the British were the chief danger. When war came in 1939, this radio warfare became intensified. Lord Haw-Haw, the Nazi radio star, built up a tremendous listening audience in England and was featured on front pages of American newspapers. In this way, direct German propaganda procured the fullest access into both Britain and the United States. Simultaneously, the Nazi barrage of anti-American broadcasts to Latin America was intensified.

The FBIS was set up at the suggestion of the State Department with the approval of the Board of War Communications to operate as a central agency serving all Government agencies requiring foreign broadcast material.

There are nine simultaneous or successive steps in FBIS operations. These are (1) Scheduling; (2) Interception; (3) and (4) Monitoring and recording (that go on simultaneously); (5) Translating; (6) Wire services, including editing and teletyping; (7) reports (including editing and mimeographing); (8) analysis (including periodic and special reports) and (9) individual services of various kinds.

Special services are provided by the FBIS to Government officials requesting them. For example; at the time of the Hitler speech following the Italian surrender, the White House had a special telephone installation with Hitler's voice on one end and Churchill, General Marshall and others on the receiving end.

Principal speeches by German and Japanese leaders, by standing order, are recorded as received on permanent high fidelity discs and are furnished the OWI and the equivalent British Overseas Broadcast agency for use in their Library of Direct Quotations.

We visited the FBIS receiving station at Silver Hill, Md., to get first-hand information on the important functions of this nonmilitary unit. There are four such stations operating for the express purpose of checking all foreign short-wave broadcast transmissions, recording their contents and interpreting them into English. The receiving stations are chosen for ex-

Organization chart of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS).





Monitoring officer "logs" transmissions from all parts of the world and notes the exact time which they are heard, together with any other information needed for future reference.

Radio transmissions are picked up by 29 SX-28 receivers and piped through the console (foreground) to the wax cylinder recorders located seven miles from this receiving station.

cellence of reception. They include a maze of communications receivers (Hallicrafters SX-28's), Memovox and Presto recorders, and various and sundry units assembled and developed by FBIS personnel. The receivers are mounted in bays. They are easily accessible from the rear for quick servicing. All of the sets are in continuous operation. There are twenty-nine of these in operation at Silver Hill alone.

In charge of each receiving station is a Monitoring Officer. Under him are a number of monitoring officers and radio operators working in shifts, whose job it is to maintain an accurate worldwide program "log" and to pretune receivers to prescheduled programs over a twenty-four hour period.

Connecting to these receivers is a highly complex antenna system including five Rhombic antennas, each covering a maximum angle of twenty degrees. The operators select the antenna which provides the strongest signals to be heard. The outputs of the receivers go through a control console provided with complete "patching" facilities. There are special telephone circuits which go to the central office located many miles distant and which terminate to wax cylinder recorders. The audio level is maintained by the console operator at a predetermined level, one which will afford correct modulation for the wax-cylinder recorders.

Other equipment, as mentioned previously, includes Memovox recorders employing paper-based discs capable of holding over an hour's recording per side. These are used when a complete transcription is required for counter-propaganda purposes. In addition, two Presto tables are in readiness to record any type of intelligence requiring high fidelity.

The FBIS interpreters are not lolated at the receiving stations. They work from the downtown headquarters of the FBIS in Washington (seven miles away). The experts of the FBIS are equipped to monitor thirty-four different languages plus thirty other dialects. Most of the interception carried out by the personnel involves voice broadcasts. A small part, particularly enemy news, is transmitted by International Morse code. The Germans use it frequently. The Jap Domei Morse in the Japanese language presents some peculiar difficulties however. It is directed from Tokyo to its satellite newspapers in the Asiatic area. The Jap announcement of the resignation of the two Japanese Chiefs of Staff, for example, was first received in the United States via these Jap press broadcasts. The Japanese language itself is written in ideographs which cannot be transferred directly into dots and dashes. They must first be changed into a Roman alphabet reading of the Jap language on a purely phonetic basis. This Romaji is then transmitted by International Morse code. At Portland, Oregon, where Jap broadcasts are monitored, engineers receive and type it out as so many meaningless letters. It is teletyped in this form and is translated to English at the Washington headquarters. Such translations take about four times as long as for any other language. These experts, specializing in various languages, listen to the programs as they come over the telephone circuits. They wear a pair of headphones and type the intelligence as they listen. They do not make a complete transcription, however, unless it is of extreme importance. A second cylinder may be cut in instantaneously so that an uninterrupted recording may be had. These are kept in special racks for a period of forty-eight hours in case an entire program is requested by one of the various agencies using the service.

Other important functions of the FBIS include editorial and teletype rooms.

A special service has been rendered on occasions to the Department of Justice. This is in connection with trials involved in sedition, violation of alien registration laws, and the treason clause of the Constitution of the United States. One of these was in

David Cooper, FBIS Supervisor, records a broadcast on a Memovox machine. Over an hour's intelligence may be recorded on each side of the flexible discs. Continuous recording is possible by using duplicate machines.



Frank X. Green, monitoring officer-in-charge, cruises the ether in search of new stations or program changes.

This monitoring officer, at Portland, Oregon, caught the sensational news that Tokyo had been raided by Gen. Doolittle's flyers. Japanese broadcasts are four times more difficult to interpret than any others.

August, 1942, of William Dudley Pelley and two other defendants on charges of having violated the federal sedition Act. Dr. Pelley, leader of the American Silver shirt organization, was publisher at the time of the trial of a periodical called "The Galilean." This periodical contained material reflecting and corresponding to the main lines of Axis propaganda and contained no material which contradicted these main lines of Axis propaganda.

Two government witnesses, one of them Ensign Harold N. Graves, Jr., then Assistant to the Director of FBIS, who testified to the main lines of Axis propaganda, identified fourteen themes constantly "harped on" by the radios of Germany and Italy. The second witness, Dr. Harold Lasswell of the Library of Congress, testified that an analysis of "The Galilean" showed it to reflect Axis propaganda to a considerable degree. It was shown at the trial that members of "The Galilean" organization actually had taken notes of foreign short-wave broadcasts and that on at least one occasion, notes from an Italian radio broadcast had appeared with some modification in following issues of "The Galilean." Pelley was convicted and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. The case was appealed but the verdict was upheld by a higher court.

Historical news, too, has come from the facilities of the FBIS. For example, the scoop story on Doolittle's raid on Tokyo back in April, 1942, was made possible by the alertness of one of the monitors at the Portland, Oregon, receiving station. Picking up the Japanese word "Kushu" and thinking simultaneously in ideographs (picture characters which give the meaning of Jap words) this monitor knew that here was the news all America awaited. Upon completion of the item it now was known that our fliers had successfully raided and bombed Kobe and Nagoya. This information was later confirmed by the Doolittle fliers themselves.

It is interesting to note that most of the operating personnel at the receiving stations are, or were, radio amateurs. Their skill and technical know-how gave them a valuable background for this type of work. In charge of the station at Silver Hill is Frank X. Green, former engineer of KFXJ, KFEL, KOA, KMA, and KIVL. While there we met an interesting chap by the name of James G. Wedewer, Assistant Monitoring Officer, who is an official of several short-wave listening clubs and an authority on short-wave broadcast stations of the world. He told us the location of all the call letters we mentioned.

A group of four Hallicrafters SX-28 receivers is used for scanning the ether for new stations, changes in schedules and other information in order to keep the "log" accurate. Each receiver is supplied with a small booklet placed in a metal clip adjacent to the set. Complete calibrations are included which show the exact tuning setting for any frequency throughout the spectrum. These must be kept currently accurate, particularly if a sudden change in weather is encountered. A constant check on frequency is had by means of several crystal controlled secondary standards that put out signals at either 100 or 1000 kc. The personnel at Silver Hill rigged up a special changeover switch (seen

(*Continued on page* 102)

Miss Ann Wilkinson, French language monitor and daughter of Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, shown listening at her post.

Wax cylinders containing the original intelligence that has been received from the elaborate receiver installation located at Silver Hill, Maryland, are kept for a period of forty-eight hours, and then are reshaven for further use.



FBIS

(*Continued from page* 28)

at the bottom of the receiver bays) so that this signal is accessible for checking the receivers simply by pressing the switch with the toe.

We have visited many military and nonmilitary installations all over the country throughout the present war. Never have we seen so many receivers going at one time in one place. If ever there was an ideal all-wave receiver this was it. In fact, it might well be called "Uncle Sam's radio set"—at least one of them.

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